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ABSTRACT 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) brings connectivity to about every objects found in the physical space. It 
extends connectivity to everyday objects. From connected fridges, cars and cities, the IoT creates 
opportunities in numerous domains. However, this increase in connectivity creates many prominent 
challenges. This paper provides a survey of some of the major issues challenging the widespread adoption 
of the IoT. Particularly, it focuses on the interoperability, management, security and privacy issues in the 
IoT. It is concluded that there is a need to develop a multifaceted technology approach to IoT security, 
management, and privacy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internet of Things (IoT) goes beyond the typical computer-based-Internet model to a 
distributed heterogeneous model of connected things. The state of the art application in the IoT 
provides IoT services based on utilizing and combining data received from various things. It is a 
complex system that has the capabilities of sensing information about the environment, 
capabilities of collecting physiological measurements, and machine operational data, abilities of 
identifying users, animals, other things, and events in an environment; and the capabilities of 
processing and communicating these data with other things [1]. Also, it has the capabilities of 
converting the data into automated instructions that feedback through the communication 
networks to other things with actuating capabilities. These things will in turn actuate other things, 
eliminating many human interference roles. Clearly, with such a diverse, complex and 
heterogeneous model of the IoT, numerous challenges arise. To realize the unique and futuristic 
characteristics of the IoT, management and security of things, should be well thought-out as one 
of the fundamental enablers of this technology. There is a need to manage the unprecedented 
number of things connected to the Internet that generate a large amount of traffics, particularly 
things with low resources. With billions of things equipped with sensors and actuators entering 
the digital word using a vast array of technologies, incorporated into devices like lights, electric 
appliances, home automation systems and a vast number of other integrated machinery devices, 
transport vehicles, and equipment; management of things become a necessity and cumbersome 
task.  
 
Towards this aim, this paper reviews some of the significant issues challenging the realization of 
the IoT with regards to interoperability, management, security, and privacy. In addition, many of 
these challenges have an associated requirement that needs to be considered. This requirement 
relates to the nature and capabilities of things. This is because, in general, things in the IoT are 
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characterized as small and lightweight devices that communicate using low-power wireless 
technologies such as ZigBee. Therefore, the things’ resources such as memory, processing power, 
and battery supply are very limited. This is, in fact, a challenge for the application of many 
traditional networking, management and security techniques. This challenge adds another 
dimension to the issues raised above. For instance, it is difficult to achieve security on lightweight 
things (e.g. parking sensors) compared to traditional computation devices (e.g. a mobile device). 
This is due to the fact that it is infeasible to apply traditional security cryptographic-based 
techniques on things with low resources with regard to computation and power resources [2]. 
Also, things or groups of things are often deployed in remote areas or in areas where accessibility 
is an issue; which makes changing the things’ batteries a difficult task. As such any computation 
activity that might consume a lot of energies or require heavy computation is considered as 
unviable. Therefore, addressing these challenges in tandem with the lightweight requirement of 
things is essential for the successful deployment and advance of the IoT. The remainder of this 
paper discusses interoperability and its different type in the IoT, WSNs integration issues and the 
management, security, and privacy issues challenging the IoT. 
 
2. INTEROPERABILITY AND INTEGRATION CHALLENGES 
 
Solutions considering the issues associated with information systems’ interoperability can be 
traced back to 1988 [3]; and perhaps even earlier. Wikipedia defines Interoperability as “the 
ability to make systems and organizations work together” [4]. The IEEE defines interoperability 
as “the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information and to use the 
information that has been exchanged” [5]. Other definitions of interoperability are further tailored 
according to the particular application’s requirements or needs. As a result, different categories of 
interoperability have been emerging. Technical interoperability [6], Semantic interoperability [7], 
Syntactic interoperability [8], and Cross-domain interoperability [9] are examples of these 
categories. All these types of interoperability are needed to support seamless and heterogeneous 
communications in the IoT. Achieving interoperability is vital for interconnecting multiple things 
together across different communication networks. It defeats the purpose to have billions of 
sensors, actuators, tiny and smart devices connected to the Internet if these devices can’t actually 
communicate with each other in a way or another. In fact, for the IoT to flourish, things 
connecting to the communication networks, which can be heterogeneous, need to be able to 
communicate with other things or applications. 
 
In traditional computer environments, computer devices are treated equally when connected to 
the Internet. Their functionalities vary depending on how the users use them. However, in the 
IoT, each device would be subject to different conditions such as power energy consumption 
restrictions, communication bandwidth requirements, computation and security capabilities. 
Additionally, things could be made by various manufacturers that do not necessarily comply with 
a common standard. Things may also operate using a variety of communication technologies. 
These technologies do not necessarily connect things to the Internet in the same way a typical 
computer device usually do. For instance, 6LoWPAN offers interoperability with other wireless 
802.15.4 devices as well as with any IP-based devices using a simple bridging device. However, 
an advanced application layer gateway is required to bridge between ZigBee and non-ZigBee 
networks [10].  
 
The highly competitive nature of the IoT makes interoperability between things even a more 
difficult task to achieve. Besides, wireless communication technologies are evolving and 
changing rapidly. This adds to the complexity of creating interoperable communications in the 
IoT as well. This inevitability results in heterogeneous devices that cannot communicate with 
each other which raise many integration issues in the IoT. Service descriptions, common 
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practices, standards and discovery mechanisms [11] are among the many other challenges that 
also need to be considered before enabling interoperable interactions between things. 
  
2.1 Integration issues 
 
The IoT is challenged by fragmented, often unpredictable, deployment of a mixture of devices 
(e.g. low-power devices with low capabilities versus more capable devices).  This is, in fact, 
constitutes a potential barrier to achieving interoperability in the IoT. Additionally, the present 
competitive market in the low-power wireless domain, where each organization is trying to push 
their standard forward is increasing the risk of non-interoperability between IoT devices creating 
integration issues. While it is essential to provide the end-user with more choices of technologies, 
certainties should be maintained. This means the IoT requires standards to enable horizontal 
platforms that are communicable, operable, and programmable across devices, regardless of their 
make, model, manufacturer, or industry applications [12].  
 
Things with sensing capabilities could be in the form of smart objects such as smart building, 
smart cars that could incorporate sensing capabilities as part of their designs and functionality, or 
simply a tiny wireless sensor. The IoT joins this mixture of devices in a heterogeneous integrated 
information system where things are capable to collaborate, communicate and provide services. 
Todays’ sensors can monitor temperature, ambiance, soil makeup, pollution in the air, noise, 
presence of objects or movements among other actuating functionalities triggered based on some 
sensed information. Traditionally, WSNs are built of several "nodes" ranging from a few nodes 
up to hundreds or even thousands connected to each other. For example, deploying a large 
number of sensors in a given forest can help detecting fires and alerting the authorities and nearby 
communities. Thus, integrating things, or group of things, in the form similar to wireless sensors 
networks (WSNs) in the IoT is expected to play a significant role in the IoT. However, this might 
not be as easy to achieve as it sounds. Integrating WSNs in the IoT, where sensor nodes 
dynamically join the Internet, collaborate or communicate with other similar nodes or things open 
the door to novel challenges. The next section explores the ways in which WSNs could join the 
Internet as part of the IoT. 
 
2.1.1 Network-based Integration 
 
In the Network-based Integration topology, the sensors join the Internet through their network 
gateway as shown in Figure 1. In the case of a multi-hop mesh wireless topology, the sensors rely 
on a base node, also known as a sink, which even possesses gateway’s capabilities or have a 
connection with a gateway. The sensors, in this case, are not directly accessible on the Internet. 
Communications between a sensor of a particular WSN and that of another WSN or/and with 
other things on the IoT are not going to be direct but via the WSN’s base node.  
 
International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications (IJNSA) Vol.8, No.2, March 2016 
88 
 
Figure 1- Network Based integration 
 
2.1.2 Independent Integration 
 
In the Independent Integration topology, the sensors can connect directly to the Internet 
independently from their base point. As a result, the interaction between an independent sensor 
and other things in the IoT can be established without the need to pass by the intermediate node 
(i.e. the sink node in the WSN). The topology of such a communication network is given in 
Figure 2. However, giving an IP address to every sensor, for the purpose of connecting to the 
Internet, may not be the right approach. This is because wireless sensors communications are 
generally characterised by their low-cost and low-power features with packets exchanged 
periodically and in small sizes [13]. Therefore, it is quite challenging to provide every IoT device 
with an IP address to connect to the Internet. This is due to the communication and processing 
overheads associated with the use of the TCP protocol that challenges the capabilities of small 
and low-cost sensors [14]. 
 
 
Figure 2- Independent integration 
 
2.1.3 Hybrid Integration 
 
Figure 3 shows the “hybrid integration” topology. In this topology, the IoT integrates WSNs 
using a mixture of the previously introduced topologies. 
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Figure 3- Hybrid integration 
 
The wireless sensor nodes involved in each of the network topologies presented in Figures 1, 2 
and 3 may have different characteristics. Their technical requirements vary from one to another. 
For instance, in the Network-based Integration network, the sensors rely on a base node when 
connecting to the IoT. The base node possesses more computational, energy and communication 
resources when compared with a regular sensor node. A base node connects to the Internet in two 
ways: 
 
(1) Basic: the base point provides basic gateway services such as protocol translation services and 
routing [15]. It typically forwards the information collected by the WSN’s nodes to a server.  
(2) Advanced: In addition to its gateway functionality, the base point has the capabilities of 
computing, and performing some data analysis. This can help reducing redundancy in the 
network.  
 
Consequently, at least the base node in a WSN requires an IP address to connect to the Internet. 
In the case of a Network-based Integration network, there is a need to identify uniquely all the 
sensors on the Internet. Traditionally, the Internet is designed around an address-centric scheme 
(IP address) as almost all transactions (HTTP, email, etc.) require information about where the 
data are hosted [16]. Henceforth, a solution based on globally uniquely identifying things should 
be explored. Dynamic address allocation schemes similar to DHCP and translation schemes 
similar to DNS need to be exploited as well. 
 
2.2 Other Interoperability Challenges 
 
A typical IoT system has been repetitively described in this paper as a system collecting and 
making use of shared data among things. However for a basic communication to occur, a user or 
device needs a way to search for things and access the data they produce. This requires an 
agreement on many fundamental communication issues such as those relating to how things are 
represented, searched and accessed on the Internet [17]. Additionally, there are associated issues 
which need to be considered as well. These issues relate to security (authorization, authentication, 
trust, integrity, validation, etc.), and privacy including privacy of the users and devices. 
Therefore, to achieve interoperability in the IoT, several other associated challenges need to be 
considered as well, including the followings: 
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Thing Interaction: As discussed in the previous section, there is more than one option to how 
things will interact with other things or the users. There exist situations where interactions with 
individual things are needed. On the other hand, there exist situations where the ability to query 
and control large groups of things at the same time is also required. 
 
Virtual Representation of Things: How things are represented, and described remains an issue 
unsolved or precisely unstandardized. For instance, do we need to establish a shared schema or 
ontology for things for greater interoperability? Which attributes should be used to describe 
things and how flexible and unified this descriptor system should be? Can we find appropriate 
ways to involve users in connecting things and resolving ambiguities based on their current 
operation or context? [17]. 
 
Searching, Finding and Accessing Things: How do we search for things on the Internet? Should 
we be able to search for things by their unique ID, IP, location, name or/and in combination with 
other properties? How can we discover, search, locate or track mobile things that may move from 
one location or network to another? How should things be organized, deployed, managed and 
secured? 
 
Syntactic Interoperability between Things: Recall that syntactic interoperability deals with the 
packaging and transmission mechanisms for data over a network. Thus, when all the above 
challenges are addressed, there will still be a need to ensure that data flow is interoperable 
between the various networks and among a mixture of devices. Translation functionalities in 
networks or in some devices, gateways or in the form of middleware sitting on the edge of a 
network are most likely needed.  
 
3. MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 
 
Traditionally, network management solutions are needed to manage network equipment, devices, 
and services. However, with the IoT, there is a need to manage not only the traditional networked 
devices and their services, but also an entirely new range of things. The enormous number of 
things and their diversity create many management requirements. Thus, traditional management 
functionalities such as remote control, monitoring and maintenance are considered of paramount 
significance for the operation of things in the IoT. However, these management capabilities need 
to evolve to cater for the unique characteristics of the IoT. This is because the IoT is of a diverse 
nature supporting heterogeneous communications and seamless machine to machine interactions. 
This is in addition to the specific management capabilities required for managing things in the 
IoT. For example, self-configuration and network reconfiguration are essential management 
requirements in the IoT. On the other hand, traditionally, network management solutions aimed at 
providing management information within a minimal response time. However, in some IoT 
scenarios which might involve lightweight devices, management solutions should provide 
comprehensive management information with minimal energy use [18]. 
 
Nevertheless, the characteristics of data generated in the IoT are distinct from other data in use 
today [19]. For instance in [20], IoT data have been described as having five distinct 
characteristics: Heterogeneity, Inaccuracy of sensed data, Scalability and Semantics. We add 
minimal or constrained as another important feature governing data in the IoT as, generally, 
things in the IoT have limited computation, communication, and power resources at their 
disposal. Additionally, in the context of IoT, data management systems must summarize data 
online from multiple heterogeneous sources while providing storage, logging, and auditing 
facilities for offline analysis [21, 22]. Therefore, management functionalities are needed to allow 
managers to perform many maintenance tasks remotely over the Internet and possibly across 
many heterogeneous interconnected networks. Such management capabilities help in reducing 
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errors and accelerating response time. The ability to turn things on and off, disconnecting things 
from specific networks, and monitoring the statuses of things are amongst the important tasks that 
a management system should support. On the other hand, having a management system deployed 
in an IoT network helps in eliminating travel’s and staff training’s costs. Also, it helps in 
accelerating the response to failure events. For example, a management system that supports the 
remote monitoring, via the Internet, of sensors and other smart devices deployed in remote 
locations or a busy city is highly beneficial and essential in emergency applications [23]. Such a 
system allows managers to remotely control, diagnose errors, and troubleshoot IoT devices in real 
time, reducing costs and accelerating many maintenance tasks.  
 
Furthermore, the magnitude of network connections and data associated with the IoT poses 
additional challenges in terms of data and service management. These challenges relate to data 
collection and aggregation, provisioning of services and control as well as monitoring the 
performance of things. Thus, performance becomes significant in IoT applications that deploy 
things in remote locations where accessibility is an issue. Performance is also considered 
important in emergency applications where failure can be catastrophic. Thus, management 
solutions should provide the capabilities needed to monitor the performance of things and the IoT 
network as well. Performance statistics relating to response time, availability, up and down time, 
and others are also highly advantageous. Other performance requirements relate to things’ 
hardware. This is because, providing insights into the health of things, and their networks are an 
important performance activity. For instance, monitoring and reporting the change in things’ state 
(e.g. the status of an actuator whether it is running or no), the ambience’s temperature, hardware’s 
temperature, battery levels, among others, are necessary for the overall management of things in 
the IoT. Table 1 describes the major management issues challenging the IoT. 
 
Table 1- Management issues 
 
Configuration 
Management 
• How things are setup and by whom? 
• Network connectivity  
• Self-configuration capability. 
• Asynchronous Transaction Support.  
• Network reconfiguration. 
Things’ 
control 
Management issues including turning things on and off, disconnecting things 
from specific networks and connecting to other. To effectively control a 
thing, a prior knowledge of the thing’s status is required. Therefore, “Things’ 
control” complements “monitoring of things.” 
Monitoring It is essential for the operation and control of things to know the status of 
things e.g. running, listening, down, sleep mode, etc. Therefore, once things 
are deployed and in use, there should be a way to monitor their statuses. 
These are in addition to: 
• Network status monitoring  
• Network topology discovery.  
• Notification.  
• Logging. 
Things’ 
maintenance: 
Detecting the failure of a thing is important, specifically in an IoT network 
which might involve a larger number of things. A tool or software is required 
for detecting and addressing things’ failure. Other issues relate to the general 
maintenance tasks of things e.g. software update, patch update, protocols 
version detections, etc. 
Things’ 
performance 
Monitoring the performance of things is needed so sign of stress can be 
detected before the occurrence of any failure. This is significant for things 
that might be deployed in remote locations, and essential in emergency 
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applications [23], where availability and other QoS parameters are of high 
importance. 
Things’ 
security and 
privacy 
There are basic security challenges such as authorization, authentication and 
access control that need to be addressed. Security bootstrapping mechanisms 
are also required. Other security issues are associated with things-to-things 
communications. For instance, if things are to be accessed by applications or 
software independently from the human users, then there are security 
measures that need to be enforced to ensure that things are not leaking 
information and disclosing private information to unauthorized things or 
used miscellaneously. Things have their users and owners. Thus privacy is 
vital as well [24]. 
Energy 
Management  
• Management of energy resources.  
• Statistics on energy levels, e.g. estimated lifespan. 
 
4. SECURITY CHALLENGES 
 
The growth in the number of connected devices to the communication networks in the IoT 
translates into increased security risks and poses new challenges to security. A device which 
connects to the Internet, whether it is a constraint or smart device, inherits the security risks of 
today’s computer devices. Almost all security challenges are found in the IoT. Hence, some 
fundamental security requirements in the IoT such as authorization, authentication, 
confidentiality, trust, and data security need to be considered.  
 
Therefore, things should be securely connected to their designated network(s), firmly controlled 
and accessed by authorized entities. Data generated by things need to be collected, analysed, 
stored, dispatched and always presented in a secure manner. Nevertheless, there are security risks 
associated with things-to-things communications as well. This is in addition to the risks relating 
to things-to-person communications. For instance, if things are to be accessed by things 
independently from the human users, then there are security measures that need to be enforced. 
These security measures are necessary to ensure that things are accessed only by authorized 
entities in a secure manner. Also, they need to ensure that things are not leaking information or 
disclosing private information to unauthorized things and users, or used miscellaneously.  
 
4.1. The Inherited Security Challenges in the IoT 
 
The IoT can be regarded as the Internet 2.0 or the future Internet. Thus, the IoT is not another 
form of communications or networks running in parallel with what we now today as the Internet; 
but indeed an expansion of it. Therefore, the IoT inherits today’s Internet security issues and 
poses some new ones as well. Figure 4 shows the security issues inherited and challenging the 
IoT. These security issues are discussed in the followings sub-sections. 
 
4.1.1. End-to-End Security 
 
Cisco defines end-to-end security as an absolute requirement for secure communications [25]. It 
is the process of protecting the communications and data exchanged between both ends of the 
communication without being read, eavesdropped, intercepted, modified, or tampered. In the IoT, 
end-to-end security remains an open challenge for many IoT devices and applications. The nature 
of the IoT with its heterogeneous architecture and devices involve the sharing of information and 
collaboration between things across many networks. This poses serious challenges to the end-to-
end security. When devices have different characteristics and operate using a variety of 
communication technologies (802.11 vs. 802.15.4), establishing secure sessions and secure 
communications, become a very complex task to achieve.  
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Additionally, not all devices in the IoT are equal. Currently, computers, smartphones, and other 
computerized devices connect to the Internet via HTTP, SMTP and the like for most of their 
activities. As such TLS and IPsec protocols are usually used to negotiate dynamically the session 
keys, and to provide the required security functions. However, some of the devices in the IoT do 
not possess the ability to run TLS and IPsec protocols due to their limited computation and power 
capabilities. Additionally, some embedded devices in the IoT have limited connectivity as such 
they may not necessarily use HTTP or even IP for the communications (e.g. a sensor in a WSN).  
 
 
 
Figure 4- Some IoT security issues 
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4.1.2. Data Security 
 
Data security involves the protection of data during communications and storages. In [26], data 
security is defined as the process of protecting data from destructive forces or from unauthorized 
access. Data security, also referred to as information security, is vital to the IoT security. Data 
security in the IoT is also associated with safety. Usually, the impact of data security breaches on 
the human life remained within the scope of hacking the personal information of an individual or 
getting unauthorised access to sensitive information such as financial data. However, data 
security breaches in the IoT could pose a serious threat to humans’ safety. For instance, the 
accidental intrusion or malicious access that could interfere or interrupt the operations of a 
driverless car or a heart pacemaker will threaten the user’s life. Security breaches in an IoT forest 
fire detection system could lead to catastrophic results as well.  
 
4.1.3. Identity and Access Management 
 
Identity theft, forgery, and masquerading among other security attacks are some of the security 
issues challenging the protection of identity in the IoT. As we have seen in section 3.2, things 
identifiers remains an unresolved issue in the IoT. How things are identified, represented, 
searched, and accessed in the IoT is still unknown. This is indeed make things vulnerable to many 
identity attacks. For instance, a device in the IoT could uses a fake identity to gain unauthorized 
access to services provided by another IoT device. This type of attack is known as the 
masquerade attack. Typically, computer devices employ secure mechanisms that rely on complex 
algorithms in detecting suspicious access to data and detect imposters. The IoT is vulnerable to 
several identity attacks including Spoofing, Masquerade, MiM and Smurf attacks as well. Thus, 
several existent traditional security solutions need to be studied and examined to determine their 
feasibility and applicability in the IoT.  
 
4.1.4. Compliance 
 
Complying with government laws and industry regulations plays an important role in preserving 
the security of IoT systems. Things in the IoT need to adhere to several data protection laws and 
privacy acts. Privacy in the IoT requires special considerations as well. This is because the IoT is 
built around autonomous communications between things. Therefore, there is a need to ensure 
privacy at all time. Initially, privacy requirements can be summarized to three key concepts: 
  
1. User consent: the user needs to be able to provide an informed consent on the usage of their 
data 
2. Freedom of choice: the user should have the freedom of opting in and out from being 
involved or being part of a communication 
3. Anonymity: the user has the right to remain anonymous when obtaining services that do not 
require identity verification or the like. 
 
4.1.5. Access Control 
 
Access control is the process of granting, limiting or restricting access to a resource. It regulates 
who or what can view or use resources. Role based access control (RBAC) is an example of a 
widely used access control model. Access control in the IoT is discussed in more details in a 
subsequent section. Henceforth, as illustrated in Figure 4, in addition to the security issues 
inherited from the traditional Internet, the IoT has a set of specific and new security problems. 
These security issues are derived from the dynamic IoT network structure, the different type of 
communications involved, and the low-cost characteristic of the IoT devices among other factors 
which are exclusively associated with the IoT. Significantly, these security issues cannot be 
solved with traditional Internet security solutions. This is due to the fact that IoT 
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communications’ architectures differ from those of the traditional Internet. As the IoT evolves 
and becomes more complex, the security issues increase in complexity as well. This increase in 
complexity can be attributed to two fundamental IoT factors: low-cost and heterogeneity.  
 
With regard to low-cost, some IoT devices should be available at relatively low prices. The low-
cost of things is a significant factor that drives the support for large-scale deployment of things in 
the IoT. However, this low-cost requirement dictates that things are mostly resource constrained. 
This translates into devices with lower computational capabilities, limited amount of memory and 
power supply. This is, in fact, constitute an obstacle for the application of many traditional 
cryptographic-based solutions. Given that traditional public-key infrastructures cannot 
accommodate the IoT [27]. For instance, the adoption of many traditional and basic Internet 
security solutions such as PKI and CA increases the cost of the IoT devices.  
 
As of heterogeneity, the diversity of devices and communications in the IoT produce many new 
security challenges as well. For instance, the integration of WSNs into the Internet, as part of the 
IoT, creates new security problems. These security problems are derived from the process of 
connecting a sensor node with an Internet device. For example, low-cost and constrained devices 
that use low-power communication technologies, such as ZigBee or IEEE 802.11ah, need to 
establish a secure communication channel with more capable devices such as a smartphone. Thus, 
securing this communication channel requires the use of adequate cryptographic and key 
management solutions without consuming a lot of bandwidth and energy. This is in addition to 
the need to employ security protocols which securely connect these devices to the Internet. Add 
another essential security requirement, such as the need to authorize the devices involved in the 
communications, and the degree of achieving security for this simple communication scenario 
increases in complexity. In [28], the authors analyzed some of the major security issues 
challenging the IoT, which lead to the proposition of some key technologies based on access 
control and user authentication. Similar works proposed solutions based on the key management 
architecture such as in [29]. While in [30], protecting the privacy of information in the IoT was 
the focus of the proposed architecture. However, these contributions are still in design stage as 
such the details of the protocols and their implementations are missing. 
 
Consequently, given that the IoT merges the traditional Internet, WSNs, PANs, Low-Power 
wireless networks and many other evolving networks together, the current Internet security 
solutions can be used to provide some security for the IoT. However, conventional Internet 
security technologies cannot provide a complete security solution for the IoT. The heterogeneity 
of devices and the multi-networks integration characteristic of the IoT in addition to the limited 
capabilities and low-cost requirement of some IoT devices create a new set of IoT own security 
problems. We will discusses in more details some of the IoT new security issues. 
 
4.1.6. Physical and DoS Security Risks 
 
Traditionally, network equipment require the protection against physical attacks and against 
unauthorized accesses e.g. the storage of routers in secure cabinets. In the IoT, many IoT devices 
require similar protection measures against physical or unauthorized attacks. Hence, 
strengthening the physical security of things is essential in many IoT applications. The IoT is 
vulnerable to the Denial of Service (DoS) attack as well. Typically, a DoS attack floods a given 
server with false requests for services. Thus, it prevents legitimate requesters from accessing the 
server’s services [31]. It attempts to exhaust the computational resources of the server. The IoT 
vulnerability to the DoS attack is not only limited to things which connect to the Internet directly, 
but also extend to WSNs. We have seen in Section 3.2 that nodes in a WSN connect to the 
Internet eventually, despite the topology used in the network. Therefore, WSNs cannot escape 
DoS attacks [32]. Additionally, the heterogeneous nature and complexity of communications 
envisioned in the IoT, makes the IoT vulnerable to the distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
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attack. A DDoS is a DoS attack made by multiple agents in the network and from various 
locations [33]. Therefore, disruptive attacks such as the DoS and DDoS attacks are a serious 
potential risk to the IoT. Many IoT devices have limited processing capabilities and memory 
constraints. Therefore, DDoS attacks can easily exhaust their resources. Also, in things- to-things 
communications, DoS attacks can prove to be difficult to notice before the disruption of the 
service which could generally be attributed to battery exhaustion [34].  
 
As a DoS countermeasure, many protocols such as DTLS, IKEv2, HIP, and Diet HIP, verifies the 
address of the initiating host before responding to requests [34]. Other DoS resistance methods 
rely on clustering techniques for detecting DoS attacks in WSNs. For example, the work in [35], 
utilizes a hierarchical clustering technique which detect abnormal behavior inside a cluster by 
analyzing the traffic on the network using an elected node. Other solutions are centered on the 
design of intrusion detection system (IDS) such as the one developed specifically to work with 
WSNs in [36]. SVELTE [37] is designed for 6Lowpan networks and aims to protect against 
routing attacks as well [37]. For further readings on the defense mechanisms available against 
DDoS attacks, the reader is referred to [38]. However, it should be noted that the practical 
implementations and performance of these methods in the IoT are yet to be explored and 
evaluated. 
 
4.2 IoT New Security Challenges  
 
Authorization, authentication, integrity, trust and confidentiality are all fundamental aspects of 
security which need to be addressed in the IoT. However, securing the IoT communications is 
challenged by the lack of a shared infrastructure and common security standards. This is, in fact, 
poses many new security issues which are by far more complicated than those found in any 
existing networking systems. Table 2 summarizes some of these security requirements: 
 
Table 2- IoT Security Requirements 
 
Authorization For smart IoT devices, this requirement can be satisfied using traditional 
authorization techniques. For constrained devices and in low-power 
wireless networks, such as ZigBee IP, unauthorized access to the IoT 
devices should be blocked at the coordinator. That’s unauthorized requests 
should not even be routed to the IoT devices as this may exhaust their 
energy. 
Authentication Authentication simply means verifying that "you are who you are claiming 
to be". This is usually done using a username and password based 
authentication system. However, this system is not secure enough. 
Passwords usually require frequent changing and it cannot be used with 
unattended devices. Also, the Secure Sockets Layer protocol (SSL) is used 
for authentication. (Mainly, a web browser authenticates web sites using 
SSL). Authentication also include the process of authenticating both the 
sender and receiver where they are able to verify the origin of the 
exchanged messages. This is a complicated security requirement in the 
IoT. This is because things might not necessarily have IP addresses.  
Integrity and 
Freshness 
Message integrity is about ensuring a message hasn’t been altered. This is 
extremely important in the IoT as many applications rely on information 
supplied by things to change the statuses of other things. Freshness is also 
vital for ensuring that no older messages are replayed. 
Confidentiality Protecting personal and sensitive data from being accessed by 
unauthorized entities in lightweight devices in the IoT is a challenging 
task. 
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4.2.1. Access Control in the IoT 
 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is a widely adopted access control approach that restricts 
access to systems or resources to authorized users. RBAC is based on the concept of assigning 
permissions to roles. For example, within a healthcare organization, roles are created for various 
job functions such as a nurse and a doctor. The permissions to perform certain operations in a 
system are assigned to specific roles. Medical staff (or other system users) are assigned to a 
particular roles. Through these role assignments, the staff acquire the permissions to perform 
particular system functions. Since users are not assigned permissions directly, but only acquire 
them through their roles, management of individual users’ privileges becomes a matter of simply 
assigning an appropriate role to the user. This simplifies common operations, such as adding a 
user or changing a user's role within a department.  
 
However, in the IoT, things and users might require to access data anytime, anywhere, from 
various types of devices, including mobile things (things on the move). Therefore, the IoT poses 
new challenges to access control. In fact, the low power requirements of things, limited 
bandwidth, heterogeneity of communications and the large scale of devices in the IoT create a 
unique set of access control requirements. Thus, traditional access control systems in their current 
status, such as RBAC, might not work efficiently in the IoT. Classically, the advantage of using 
RBAC in a system is the ability of easily adding access rights to a user, as long as it uses existing 
roles. In the IoT, as the number of connected devices and networks grow, the number of users and 
devices requesting access to data and services grow as well. Therefore, an IoT system that 
comprises thousands of devices would perhaps ends up with thousands of roles and permissions 
that need to be maintained. Therefore, the challenge of managing access control to thousands of 
devices in the IoT will be simply transformed into a complex task that requires the management 
of a vast number of roles. This is known as “role explosion” and it is a major drawback of RBAC. 
This is because adding new roles to a system require a system-wide update. Generally, RBAC 
systems are implemented in a centralized architecture whereas an access control server assigns 
roles to users and grants them access to resources. Thus, updates at the system level are even 
harder to implement in the IoT given its distributed architecture. 
 
Attribute based access control (ABAC) is an access control model that abstract identity, role, and 
resources information of the traditional access control into entity attributes [39]. ABAC grants 
accesses to services based on the attributes possessed by the requester [40]. Therefore, unlike 
RBAC, the ABAC model uses attributes to describe requesters and the requested services.  The 
associated attributes of each entity can be defined according to the system needs [41]. Relying on 
attributes provides a much more fine-grained access control approach. As such access control 
strategies can be designed to use not only the requester’ attributes but also other contextual data 
e.g. the location of the requester. Therefore, rather than grating or denying access to a resource 
based on the role of a user, ABAC combines together the user’s attributes along with other 
contextual information which provide a way of dynamically generating context aware decisions 
for requests [42]. This makes ABAC suitable for adoption in systems that require fine grained 
access control such as the IoT. Additionally, ABAC better adapts to the access control 
requirements in the IoT including the dynamic expansion of large scale users and things. The 
advantages of using ABAC in the IoT can be summarized to as follows: 
 
• Data minimization: ABAC uses attributes to identify requesters. Significantly, resources are 
also represented using an attributes schema. Therefore, ABAC can be used to provide access 
only to the personal data required for the provision of a request to a service. This concept is 
known as data minimization 
• Privacy enhancement: ABAC supports data minimization. This allows an organization to 
better design privacy statements where only the required data are specified. 
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• Policy driven decisions: Access decisions to resources are managed via policies rather than 
by individuals. 
• Dynamic: Access decisions are made during runtime since they use context information as 
well. Example: let’s assume there is exist a policy that grants access to a specific resource 
only to requesters located in Sydney. Therefore, the system during runtime will need to check 
the location of the requester before making an access decision. 
• Flexibility: Access decisions are associated with access policies rather roles. This allows the 
system to be more flexible in designing policies according to needs. This is because 
permissions are no longer bound to roles as in the RBAC. Instead, RBAC allows policies’ 
customizations that leverage accesses to resources. This feature of RBAC enables owners or 
administrators to apply access control policies on things without the need to acquire a prior 
knowledge on the requester(s). For example, when a new device joins a system, there will be 
no need for the rules or policies to be modified. As long as the new device is assigned the 
attributes necessary for accessing the required resources. Therefore, the ability of 
accommodating external entities is one of the primary benefits of using ABAC in the IoT. 
ABAC rules can evaluate attributes of a subject and resources that are not necessary 
inventoried in the authorization system as well. 
• Fine grained: ABAC rules can be fine-grained and contextual.  
 
Consequently, ABAC is a promising access control technology for the IoT. Many researches have 
started to explore the benefits of using ABAC for managing access control to things and 
resources in the IoT. For instance the work in [39], proposes an authentication method based on 
ABAC for the IoT. In [43], the authors highlight the importance of using ABAC in the IoT and 
Big Data. They provide application examples of ABAC. Also, the study discusses some potential 
IoT applications where ABAC can be used to provide access control. For example, airlines, 
financial sectors, exporters, hospitals, among other organizations are described as possible IoT 
applications that could benefit from the use ABAC in managing access control. For instance in 
the health sector, the study points out that from a patient perspective ABAC can be used to 
effectively collect users’ consent for the management of patients’ EHRs. Moreover, an access 
control solution based on ABAC policy can be used to provide patients with a granular capability 
allowing them to manage their personal information [43]. 
 
5. PRIVACY CHALLENGES 
 
The IoT highly distributed nature of technologies, such as embedded devices in public areas, 
create weak links that malicious entities can exploit and can as well open the door for a mass 
surveillance, tracing, tracking, and profiling of the users’ movements and activities [44]. 
Nowadays, the proliferation of mobile devices, GPS systems and other evolving technologies into 
our lives has introduced several privacy threats. For instance, the study in [45] showed that a 
driver’s home location can be inferred from the GPS data collected from his vehicle even if the 
location information was anonymized. It further shows that the reconstruction of an individual’s 
route could provide a detailed movement profile that allows for inferences. For example, 
recurring visits to a medical clinic could indicate illness and visits to activist organizations could 
hint at political opinion. Other studies such as [46] reported some privacy incidents from the use 
of mobile applications on the Android, Blackberry, iPhone, and Windows Phone platforms. Thus, 
it is most likely that privacy incidents will grow rapidly with the increase in penetration of the 
IoT in our daily life. 
 
Therefore, privacy is one of the major implications as the Internet of Things develops. Privacy no 
longer means anonymity in the IoT. Profiling and data mining within any IoT scenario can form a 
potential harm to individuals due to the automatic process of data collection, their storage and the 
way personal data can be easily shared and analyzed. One of the promising features of the IoT is 
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the ability of devices to observe and sense their environments. Thus, attackers may configure 
devices to join a given IoT system or network for the purpose of miscellaneously collecting 
information about the system environment and the user. The most serious concern with things in 
the IoT is their ability to initiate, by themselves, exchange of information with each other’s. 
Smart devices such as smart home appliances, smart cars and others that log data about their 
environment, e.g., their locations, constitute a source of risks and vulnerabilities, with regard to 
privacy, to their owners. If these devices are connected together, as envisioned in the IoT, and 
these logs are shared among IoT applications, then there is an increased risk of personal 
information leakage which threaten the users’ privacy.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In the early days of the Internet which was basically centered on computers, a network of 
networks was the term used to define the Internet. In the IoT, it seems everything is going to be 
connected, pants, shoes, shirts, fridges, glasses, washing machines, plants, dogs, cars, airplanes, 
cities, you name it. Yet, the term network of networks can still be used to define the IoT. 
However, what’s new is that connected networks are no longer limited to IP connected 
devices/networks in the fashion that we know today. Instead, there are islands of networks 
connecting using various network technologies. This paper reviewed some of the major 
challenges facing the IoT. Today, the majority of IoT devices are connected to a mobile phone 
application. To get anything done, the user has to administer an array of applications in addition 
to jumping from an application to another in order to control what should be a smart device. We 
are at risk of creating remote islands of IoT technologies instead of achieving a true vision of IoT. 
The IoT has the potential of shaping the way we consume energy, improve resources efficiency 
such as food and water, and support assisted living, access to healthcare, and so much more by 
connecting different applications together. Therefore, for the realization of a true vision of the 
IoT, major challenges such as achieving interoperability between the various IoT enabling 
technologies and devices were identified in this research. Additionally, the main challenge is not 
only in simply building an IoT system that connects various IoT devices together, but in 
maintaining scalable, private, secure and trustworthy operations on the IoT. Consequently, it is 
concluded that there is a need to accommodate the differences in technologies across the various 
areas of the IoT.  
 
For the future advancement of the IoT, it is therefore imperative to develop a multifaceted 
technology approach to IoT security, interoperability, management and privacy. The 
internetworking mechanisms of things, WSNs and traditional computer devices in the IoT are 
vital with respect to standardizing the communications on the Internet. It is also crucial to have 
lightweight, scalable and adaptive security solutions in place to secure the users’ information and 
preserve their privacy in the IoT. 
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